







In the almost 90 years since the first modern multilateral trade treaty was ratified,1 over 
400 Regional Trade Agreements (‘RTAs’) have been concluded,2 with the World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’) providing legal principles and an institutional foundation for the 
world trading system. Meanwhile, human-made environmental problems, and domestic 
and international laws responding to these problems, have also multiplied. These laws 
include restrictions on imports of products identified as environmentally-harmful, as well 
as the introduction of national environmental standards and regulatory requirements that 
complicate the free movement of goods and services. In various capacities and 
circumstances, the WTO has evaluated the compatibility of environmental trade 
restrictions with key WTO principles. A recurring question has been whether regulation 
that restricts trade in imported goods on environmental grounds can be reconciled with 
the core WTO principle of non-discrimination based upon origin. Further, countries have 
made treaty commitments under a wide range of Multilateral Environmental Agreements; 
in some cases these clash with WTO obligations. Finally, the trade liberalization that the 
WTO and RTAs have facilitated has contributed to macroscopic trends of economic 
globalization. These include increased international transit of goods, increased resource 
                                                        
1 The 1929 Convention on Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (‘Prohibitions 
Convention’).  
2 See the WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm 
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exploitation and CO2 emission resulting from economies of scale, and the ‘export’ of 
environmental regulation and standards (or lack thereof) to foreign firms seeking market 
access.  
These many intersections have led to vigorous debate about what is often 
described as the trade and environment relationship. In this chapter I focus on how 
environmental protection has been understood and addressed within the WTO and its 
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’). I also take account 
of the contributions of external meaning makers, notably civil society, academics and 
corporate lobbies, who helped shape these discourses.  
At the core of the WTO’s understanding of the environment is a consensus 
enshrined in the texts of WTO treaties: that trade and environment are ‘mutually 
supportive’. Treaties proscribe legal obligations, often characterized as ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ 
depending on how precise and binding they are. 3  These obligations are agreed by 
consensus among WTO Members, who comprise virtually all the world’s governments; 
thus they bridge a vast array of national positions. When considering the extent to which 
the WTO should take account of, and respond to, the demands of environmental 
protection, there is a large degree of divergence, making hard obligations difficult to 
achieve. The concept of ‘mutual supportiveness’ entails no binding action or duty. The 
term can be described as positively ambiguous: positive because the presumption is one 
of harmony; ambiguous because this positivity can be interpreted as assertion or 
aspiration.   
                                                        
3 See eg KW Abbott and D Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54(3) 
International Organization, 421-456.  
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Section 2 develops a mind map of varying discourses on ‘environment’ in the 
context of the concept of mutual supportiveness. Section 3 traces discursive change 
regarding the term through the history of the world trading system. Section 4 reflects on 
an emerging dichotomy that complicates existing discourses identified herein, separating 
those who advocate multilateral approaches to trade liberalization and environmental 
protection from those who discredit multilateral approaches as well as their goals. Section 
5 concludes.  
 
2. Mind map  
 
The existence of ‘mutual supportiveness’ between trade and environmental policies 
comprises a normative understanding that economic development, through trade 
liberalization, will lead to better environmental protection. This is made clear in the 
WTO’s current negotiating framework and its founding treaty; many major international 
environmental treaties contain similar or identical language affirming that an open 
multilateral trade system will benefit the environment. This understanding resolves 
perceived conflicts between ‘environment’ and ‘development’, examined further below, 
through an emphasis on ecological modernization.  
Yet WTO negotiations and reports of the WTO and GATT Secretariats make 
clear that many Members have expressed competing conceptions of the trade and 
environment relationship. One is that trade liberalization and environmental protection 
are mutually antagonistic: growing environmental regulation described as ‘green 
protectionism’ which undermines free trade and the broader goal with which it is often 
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conflated, economic development. Developing countries often complain that developed 
countries impose complex environmental regulatory requirements as trade barriers.4 At 
times developed countries, notably the US, have also criticized environmental regulation 
that impedes important export markets, such as Genetically Modified crops. 5   This 
underscores that countries’ positions vis-à-vis particular environmental regulations are 
shaped by their export interests and the corporate lobbies that represent them, the latter 
thus forming another environmental ‘meaning maker’.  
Another important discourse that has run through the WTO and the GATT before 
it is that of mutual exclusion: environmental protection is sometimes described as a ‘non-
trade’ issue, falling outside the ‘WTO mandate’. Even while the WTO’s founding treaty 
sets out its objective of securing sustainable development, WTO Members have also 
circumscribed its mandate as consisting of ‘trade issues’. As the argument goes, the WTO 
does not have the capacity or expertise to respond adequately to environmental problems. 
In practice this prohibition serves to delimit the WTO’s environmental responsibilities. It 
led, for example, to the selection of CTE negotiating items in which trade liberalization 
will benefit the environment (such as trade in Environmental Goods and Services).  
Mutual supportiveness provides a pragmatic formulation to span these contentious 
discourses. It provides a basis for consensus by avoiding the establishment of any formal 
hierarchy, which would threaten the interests of many stakeholders. Indeed, the concept 
tows a somewhat contradictory line: it purports to address, but also negates the possibility 
of, conflict. As multilateral treaty language, its non-binding nature and the positive 
                                                        
4 GP Sampson, The WTO and Sustainable Development (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 
20-21. See also JH Jackson, ‘WTO Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Conflict or Congruence?’ 
(1992) 49 Washington and Lee Law Review, 1230.  
5 R Eckersley, ‘The Big Chill: the WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2004) 4(2) Global 
Environmental Politics, 44.   
 5 
ambiguity surrounding its interpretation contribute to its success. Additionally, while the 
negotiations makes clear that mutual supportiveness implies an obligation to seek good 
faith solutions in the event of conflict, the concept does not proscribe any precise legal 
obligation. In sidestepping this challenge, Members circumscribe the WTO’s 
environmental ambition.  
A final discourse, most evident in academic literature, presents the WTO’s 
approach to the environment in evolutionary terms as an arc of progress from the GATT 
to the WTO. There has been progress, but deep divisions between WTO Members mean 
that the hallmark of the WTO approach to the environment has been caution. WTO 
negotiators and the Appellate Body have maintained ambiguity regarding the ‘tough 
questions’ that arise when there are actual or potential clashes. The result is to preserve, 
passively, the primacy of WTO obligations.  
 
3. Discursive change 
 
A. Origins of the multilateral trade system  
 
The WTO website states that the awareness of the relationship between trade and the 
environment of its predecessor, the GATT, dates back to 1970.6 Trade scholars often 
echo this message, asserting that the environment was not on the agenda of GATT 
negotiators in the late 1940s as it was simply not a recognized international concern.7 
                                                        
6 ‘Early years: emerging environment debate in GATT/WTO, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm 
7 See, eg: ‘Despite the current recognition, the original GATT agreement ….did not consider the 
environmental effects of its trade rules on the production of goods.… This inattention to environmental 
 6 
Sympathetic academics, the WTO Secretariat and trade negotiators often portray the 
WTO’s support for, and understanding of, environmental protection in an evolutionary 
light. While some GATT rulings were problematic, later disputes, notably the so-called 
‘Shrimp-Turtle’ World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) dispute of 1998, marked the 
emergence of adequate ‘policy space’8 for environmental regulation.  
However, while there was an explosion of multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) and domestic environmental regulation starting in the 1970s, which drove these 
issues higher up the GATT agenda, ‘trade’ and ‘environment’ treaties have been 
coordinated and interconnected. International efforts to manage wildlife trade and 
conservation arose contiguously with early trade treaties. Negotiators recognized that 
trade restriction played an important role in enabling wildlife conservation treaties to 
achieve their goals. In 1900, European colonial powers signed the Convention for the 
Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish (London Convention); in the same year the 
US passed its first federal law protecting wildlife, the Lacey Act, which prohibited trade 
                                                                                                                                                                     
matters may have been due to the fact that environmentalism was a relatively new concern in national and 
international policy areas…..’ S Alam, ‘Trade-Environment Nexus in Gatt Jurisprudence: Pressing Issues 
for Developing Countries’ (2005) 17(2) Bond Law Review, 2; ‘There is likewise little evidence that any of 
the GATT's provisions were drafted to advance global environmental interests. This is not surprising, since 
at the time there was little governmental knowledge of, or interest in, domestic or international 
environmental issues’ JL Dunoff, ‘Institutional Misfits: the GATT, the ICJ and Trade-Environment 
Disputes’, (1994) 15 Michigan Journal of International Law, 1043; S Schmidheiny, ‘Changing Course: A 
Global Business Perspective on Development and the Environment’ (1992) 2(1) Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 74 ("It is hardly surprising that GATT does not deal effectively with environment or 
sustainable development issues, as neither was an international concern when it was set up."); EB Weiss, 
‘Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A Commentary’ (1992) 86 American 
Journal of International Law, 728.  ("In the immediate postwar period, countries were not concerned with 
the environment, because they had not yet recognized their capacity to degrade it irreversibly....). The latter 
two references and quotes are drawn from Dunoff.  
8 See note 7; also H Andersen, ‘Protection of Non-Trade Values in WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence: 
Exceptions, Economic Arguments, and Eluding Questions’, (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic 
Law, 383-405; S Charnovitz, ‘The WTO’s Environmental Progress’, (2007) 10(3) Journal of International 
Economic Law, 685-706.  
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in animals hunted illegally. 9  During the years leading up to World War II further 
multilateral treaties were concluded for conserving natural and living resources.10  In 
1929, the Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and 
Restrictions (‘Prohibitions Convention’) was also concluded. Its original 29 signatories 
included the same trade powers behind the London Convention and the Lacey Act. 
Aware that promoting free movement of goods could undermine these efforts, they 
excluded from coverage ‘measures taken to prevent them [animals or plants] from 
degradation or extinction’.11  
Soon after the end of World War II the United Nations launched negotiations for 
an International Trade Organization. The proposed Havana Charter founding the ITO 
incorporated similar language on measures to protect animals and plants. The ITO also 
acknowledged that existing treaties on wildlife conservation should take precedence in 
the event of a conflict. It contained an exception for measures ‘taken in pursuance of any 
inter-governmental agreement which relates solely to the conservation of fisheries 
resources, migratory birds or wild animals’.12 In this respect it was more deferent to 
environmental treaties than the current WTO, which contains no such exception. Indeed, 
incorporating such an exception into the WTO, which declares that Multilateral 
                                                        
9 US Fish and Wildlife Service, ‘The Lacey Act’, available at: https://www.fws.gov/international/laws-
treaties-agreements/us-conservation-laws/lacey-act.html 
10 These included the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Flora and Fauna in their Natural State 
(1933) and the Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere 
(1940) 
11Protocol to the Convention, Section III, Ad. Article 4. Available at: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-
treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0651.pdf 
12 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment held at Havana, Cuba (‘Havana Charter’), Final 
Act and Related Documents, 1948, Article 45, General Exceptions to Chapter IV, (1)f. Available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/E_CONF.2_78-E.pdf 
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Environmental Agreements should prevail in a conflict, is a proposal often made by 
environmental advocates.13 
The ITO formed part of the UN and its larger aims to achieve peace and 
prosperity, economic and social development.14 As well as giving employment equal 
billing to trade as a treaty objective (the ‘Havana Charter on Trade and Employment’), it 
also safeguarded labour standards, an issue which has continued to elude formal 
recognition by WTO Members. Doomed by its deep ambition to regulate the global 
economy, which included management of countries’ trade balances, it was never ratified, 
but remains an alternative vision for an international trade organization with more 
broadly-conceived aims and objectives.  
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947 became the de facto 
governing instrument for international trade. The GATT included a General Exception, 
Article XX. Its negotiators neglected to include a specific exception for ‘conservation of 
fisheries resources, migratory birds or wild animals’ discussed in the preparatory work 
for the Havana Treaty.15 It does, however, permit trade-restrictive measures that fall into 
certain categories with antecedents in the Prohibitions Convention, Articles XX(b) and 
(g), which apply to measures protecting human, animal or plant life or health, and 
conserving exhaustible natural resources, respectively. The chapeau to Article XX applies 
an additional non-discrimination test, requiring that the measure should not constitute 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or ‘disguised restriction on international trade’ 
in ‘countries where the same conditions prevail’. GATT 1947, including Article XX, was 
                                                        
13 Eckersley, above n. 5, at 44.  
14 Havana Charter, above n. 12, Chapter 1, Purpose and Objectives, Article 1. 
15 See United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna. Not adopted, circulated 3 September 1991. 
[Hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin], para. 3.30. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm  
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incorporated into the WTO Agreements in the form of GATT 1994, still often invoked by 
WTO Members in disputes. Thus GATT Article XX(b) and (g) remain important in 
disputes on environmental regulation; many such disputes in the GATT and later the 
WTO have turned on the interpretation of these phrases.16  
 
B. The 1970s: Pollution, regulation, development  
 
In the 1970s two parallel narratives about the trade and environment relationship 
developed. First, the GATT was positioned as a body with competence to address 
negative impacts of environmental regulation on trade, feeding its expertise and priorities 
into international environmental negotiations. Second, as a settlement of the North-South 
divide, the UN Conference on the Human Environment (‘UNCHE’) arrived at a positive 
construction of the relationship between environmental and development. This laid the 
groundwork for subsequent treaties to position trade – a driver of economic development 
– as a support for environmental protection.  
By the 1970s the GATT was a heterogeneous global organization including 
newly-independent former colonies.17 As the GATT proved its utility in facilitating tariff 
reduction, the final two rounds of GATT negotiations in the 1970s and 80s increasingly 
focused on reducing non-tariff barriers to trade.18 The GATT obligates countries to treat 
the products from all WTO Members equally vis-à-vis one another (the Most Favoured 
                                                        
16 See, eg, US – Gasoline (1996), US – Shrimp (1998), Brazil – Tyres (2007), US – Tuna II (2012), and EC 
– Seal Products (2014). 
17 HV Milner, ‘Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries’ 
(2005) 59 International Organization, 107–143 
18 ‘The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh’, WTO website: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm 
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Nation Principle set out in Article I:1) and vis-à-vis domestic products (the National 
Treatment Principle set out in Article III). As opposed to tariffs that are collected at the 
border, these non-discrimination provisions focus primarily on internal domestic 
regulation. They apply not only to laws that specify different treatment of products based 
on their origin (de jure discrimination) but also to de facto discrimination from origin-
neutral laws. Determining whether a domestic regulation contravenes these provisions 
requires intensive judicial review.  
This emphasis on non-discrimination was significant as the 1970s also marked the 
beginning of the global environmental movement and an explosion of domestic 
environmental regulation worldwide. The 1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm (UNCHE) was the first to focus on environmental issues. In 
negotiations, developing countries threatened to boycott on the basis that they were being 
asked to take responsibility for problems they did not create. There was concern among 
countries long subject to colonization that binding international commitments would 
infringe upon sovereign use of natural resources. 19 This resulted in a broad yet shallow 
treaty that focused on linking the environment to the imperative of encouraging 
development and global equality. In the words of Indira Gandhi, who represented India: 
‘Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters?...The environment cannot be improved 
in conditions of poverty. Nor can poverty be eradicated without the use of science and 
technology.’20  
Gandhi’s statements illustrate the premise that provided a basis for international 
                                                        
19 K Mickelson, 'The Stockholm Conference and the Creation of the North-South Divide in International 
Environmental Law and Policy,' in Mickelson et al., International Environmental Law and the Global 
South (Cambridge University Press: 2015), 109-129. 
20 I Gandhi, ‘The Unfinished Revolution’ (1972) 28 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 35. 
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consensus on the need to protect the environment. It is summarized neatly by the motto of 
the UN Environment Programme, founded at the UNCHE: ‘environment for 
development’. This justification for environmental protection draws from ecological 
modernization, a school of thought that focuses on the contributions of environmental 
protection to economic development, and the environmental Kuznet’s curve, which posits 
that increasing GDP leads to better domestic environmental outcomes.21  
The idea of ‘mutual supportiveness’ between trade and environment had not yet 
been adopted. By linking trade with economic development and prosperity, it extends the 
same premise that was so useful in achieving consensus in the UNCHE context. Yet 
when the GATT Secretariat was invited to contribute to UNCHE it raised concerns about 
regulation for environmental protection. It produced a report on ‘Industrial Pollution 
Control and International Trade’,22 which examined ways in which the proliferation of 
environmental regulation might distort free trade. It analysed different forms of 
regulation or trade restriction that countries might impose in order to compensate 
domestic industries for the costs of increased anti-pollution regulation, ranking them in 
terms of their trade-distorting effects and likelihood to contravene GATT obligations.23  
 
C: 1980s and 90s: Treaty harmony, civil society rage 
 
As these contrasting narratives of harmony and conflict between economic development 
and environmental protection were further developed, their potential for incongruence 
                                                        
21 See D Stern, ‘The rise and fall of the environmental Kuznet’s curve (2004) 32(8) World Development, 
1419-1439. 
22 ‘Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade’, Report by the GATT Secretariat, L/3538, 9 June 
1971, available at: https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90840247.pdf 
23 Ibid at 13-19. 
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became clearer. During the late 1980s and early 1990s a number of major environmental 
treaties proclaimed the contribution of trade liberalization to environmental protection; 
simultaneously, there was increasing protest against the GATT’s environmental record.  
In 1989, the World Commission on Environment and Development produced 
‘Our Common Future’, also known as the Brundtland Report, which established the term 
‘sustainable development’ as a locus for international law. The term itself frames a 
resolution of the UNCHE challenge: constructing the relationship between environmental 
protection and development in a positive and general enough manner to create 
international consensus. Trade was positioned as a force to support environmental 
protection. During the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, environment ministers suggested that 
the only contribution GATT should make to sustainable development was to conclude the 
Uruguay Round successfully.24  The non-binding Agenda 21 (an Agenda for the 21st 
century) concludes that an open multilateral trading system is consistent with sustainable 
development; improved market access for developing countries’ exports will have a 
positive environmental impact.25 Agenda 21 includes the first treaty reference to mutual 
supportiveness: ‘[t]he international community should provide a supportive international 
climate for achieving environment and development goals by…making trade and 
environment mutually supportive’.26 Indeed, both sustainable development and mutual 
supportiveness provide the same broad-brush reconciliation of potential conflict.27  
                                                        
24 United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, Chapter 1, Objectives 2.9(a) 3. 
25 ‘Agenda 21’, United Nations Conference for Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
Article 2.5. Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf 
26 Pavoni argues that mutual supportiveness is the ‘interpretative pillar’ of sustainable development: R 
Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed for the 
‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ (2010) 21(3) European Journal of International Law, 662.  
27 See also: E Lydgate’ Sustainable development in the WTO: From mutual supportiveness to balancing’, 
(2012) 11(4) World Trade Review, 621-639. 
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In fact, tensions between major export industries and environmental lobbies were 
growing. The first GATT dispute on environmental regulations took place in 1991: 
United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, often referred to as Tuna – Dolphin.28 
Mexico complained that the US Marine Mammal Protection Act, which banned tuna 
caught by ‘purse seine’ nets that also trapped and killed dolphins, was discriminatory. 
The US aimed to protect dolphins that were not in its own domestic territory, but rather 
that of Mexico. The GATT Panel decided a country taking trade action to attempt to 
enforce its own laws in another country could not take recourse to the Article XX 
exception detailee above.29 It also ruled that the US could not legally ban tuna because it 
objected to the way that it was produced.  
The GATT Secretariat published a study underscoring the Panel’s ruling. After 
concluding that trade benefits the environment, it warned that protectionist interests can 
exploit environmental regulation, stating that:  
If the door were opened to use trade policies unilaterally to offset the 
competitiveness effects of different environmental standards, or to attempt to 
force other countries to adopt domestically-favoured practices and policies, the 
trading system would start down a very slippery slope.30 
It identified environmental policies as a ‘potentially serious source of new 
protectionism’.31 US environmentalists responded by launching protests against ‘GATT-
                                                        
28 Tuna-Dolphin, above n. 15.  
29 A useful summary of the dispute is available on the WTO website: ‘Mexico etc versus US: ‘tuna-
dolphin’, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm 
30 ‘Trade and the Environment’, GATT/1529, 3 February 1992, 6. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91600309.pdf 
31 Ibid at p. 34. 
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zilla’ trampling over national regulation. The strength of the public protest contributed to 
the decision of the US and Mexico that the ruling should not be implemented.32 
But the ruling simply put into practice concerns of GATT Members about 
‘unilateral’ trade-restrictive regulation to address transboundary environmental problems. 
Regulation based upon processes and production methods, or PPMs in WTO parlance, 
are split into the categories of product-related and non-product-related (‘NPR’). The 
former, while physically invisible, have to do with quality or functionality. This dispute 
concerned the latter: invisible distinctions based on NPR PPMs, in this case a ban applied 
to fish caught following a particular fishing process. Basing trade distinctions on such 
distinctions intrudes deeply into the production process in order to impose foreign values; 
many GATT members rejected the legitimacy of basing trade restrictions on such 
distinctions.33 The earlier chapter in this volume, on Protectionism, provides a useful 
companion analysis here.  
The ruling and report clarified that countries could not utilize trade restriction to 
achieve environmental objectives if it required exporting countries to modify their 
production practices. This undermined national environmental regulation, and threw into 
doubt the GATT-legality of national trade restrictions responding to multilateral 
obligations. A sub-set of MEAs utilize trade restrictions, such as import or export bans, 
requirements for packaging or shipping, requirements receive consent from importing 
countries, or simply reporting requirements. These restrict trade in environmentally-
                                                        
32 For an overview of the dispute and its aftermath, see RW Parker, ‘The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage 
to Protect the Global Commons: What we can learn from the Tuna-Dolphin conflict’ (1999-2000) 12 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 1, 43-47.  
33 For a useful overview of the early evolution of this issue please see: S Charnovitz, ‘The Law of 
Environmental ‘PPMs’ in the WTO: Debunking the myth of illegality (2002) 27(1) Yale Journal of 
International Law, 59-110.   
 15 
harmful goods,34 and encourage MEA participation and compliance.35  
In describing the negotiations of the Montreal Protocol, Brack stated that the 
"trade provisions of the Protocol ... were a vital component in (a) building the wide 
international coverage the treaty has achieved and (b) preventing industrial migration to 
non-parties to escape the controls on ODS [ozone depleting substances]."36 Parker well-
summarized the utility of trade restrictions in achieving stronger outcomes for MEAs 
with a rhetorical question: ‘Can a world of over 150 nation-states effectively preserve 
what is left of its global commons by consensus only, without any use of trade 
leverage?’ 37  As described above, early trade negotiators were mindful that trade 
restrictions were necessary to curb species extinction, and deferred to relevant MEAs. In 
contrast, the GATT ruling suggested that national efforts to implement trade-related 
obligations of MEAs would be GATT-illegal. 
Despite these dismal implications, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development incorporated the central premises of the GATT report on Trade and 
Environment. Principle 12 states that ‘States should cooperate to promote a supportive 
and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and 
sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental 
degradation.’ It then draws from language of the chapeau of GATT Article XX, 
concluding that environmental trade policy measures should not ‘constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade’. 
                                                        
34 Eg, CITES bans trade in endangered species; the Basel Convention bans export in hazardous waste 
without meeting particular procedures for consent. 
35 Eg, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer bans Parties from importing 
ozone-depleting substances from non-Parties; the Basel Convention prohibits import and export of 
hazardous wastes between Parties and non-Parties. 
36 D Brack, International Trade and the Montreal Protocol (Earthscan Ltd: 1996), xvii.  
37 Parker, above n. 33, at 3.  
 16 
It finally states that countries should avoid attempting to regulate environmental 
challenges in other countries through trade measures on a unilateral basis, urging 
international cooperation.38  
In 1992 European countries convened the Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade (EMIT group). The group had not been convened since its founding 
in 1971, but GATT Members faced unprecedented countervailing environmental 
pressures. On the one hand, many Members, in particular developing countries, were 
concerned about the proliferation of environmental regulation. On the other, the GATT’s 
poor environmental record formed a significant focus of protest. Though clearly these 
stakeholders had opposing goals, both prompted greater environmental responsiveness 
from GATT Members.  
The remarks of the Chairperson summarizing Members’ positions after the first 
meeting encapsulate the core discourses prevalent among GATT Members and illustrate 
how they attempt to reconcile countervailing objectives. The Chairperson affirmed that 
the GATT’s competence was limited to trade policies and aspects of environmental 
policies that would affect trade. He underlined the ecological modernization view that the 
multilateral trade system could help address environmental degradation and over-
exploitation in developing countries. Finally, he concluded that the trade system and 
sustainable development do not need to contradict; but trade rules should not be 
undermined by environmental measures. 39  These statements reveal the utility to 
                                                        
38 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development. Available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
1annex1.htm 
39 Summary of the First Meeting, Held at the International Conference Centre Geneva, 2 December 1992, 
SR48/1, 5 January 1993,, at [10]-[13].  
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negotiators of positive ambiguity in steering a route through the opposing goals of 
relevant meaning makers, a theme further examined in the sections below.  
 
D: Founding of the WTO: progress? 
 
These same pressures that motivated the EMIT group shaped the decision to place more 
emphasis on the environment in the WTO, which was founded two years later (in 1994), 
replacing the GATT as the multilateral institution governing trade. As well as 
incorporating the original GATT, it contained additional Agreements on areas such as 
services, subsidies, technical regulation, sanitary and health regulation and intellectual 
property rights. Elements of some of these Agreements pertained to the environment, and 
arguably the most significant developments were the enshrining of sustainable 
development as a WTO objective in the Preamble to the founding Marrakesh Agreement, 
and the establishment of a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). The latter 
formalized and expanded the work of the EMIT group as a standing Committee of the 
WTO. ‘Making international trade and environmental policies mutually supportive’40 is 
its aim: this is the first mention in WTO treaty texts of the phrase, echoing its use in 
Agenda 21. In a 1996 report, the CTE expanded on this, stating that the aims of the WTO 
and that of environmental protection ‘are both important and they should be mutually 
supportive in order to promote sustainable development’. It also reiterated that the 
WTO’s competence was limited to trade-related aspects of environmental protection.41  
                                                        
40 Decision of 14 April 1994, MTN/TNC/45(MIN) 
41 Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment, 12 November 1996, WT/CTE/1, paras. 167-
168.  
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The CTE responded to concerns about trade impacts on the environment 
fomented by Tuna – Dolphin. Yet it also provided for greater scrutiny of domestic trade-
restrictive environmental regulation. As stated by Eckersley, ‘These twin, and somewhat 
contradictory, objectives had already surfaced in the EMIT and they reflect persistent 
differences among the members – particularly between developed and developing 
countries.’42 [footnote omitted]  
The CTE embraced, but also circumscribed, the WTO’s environmental 
responsibilities. The Decision on Trade and Environment, founding the CTE, states the 
need to coordinate trade and environment policies, but: 
… without exceeding the competence of the multilateral trading system, which is 
limited to trade policies and those trade-related aspects of environmental policies 
which may result in significant trade effects for its members… 
Thus, despite the WTO’s expansion of thematic coverage, it did not re-capture the 
breadth and ambition of the abandoned ITO. Indeed, as noted by Lang, not only trade 
negotiators but also academic trade lawyers have reinforced this division: in both 
contexts, the environment is often described as a ‘non-trade’ issue. 43  In becoming 
reflexive, this rhetorical separation circumscribes the way that we understand the 
responsibility of the international trade system to examine its environmental impacts. 
Lang further stated that  
It is not self-evident, of course, that the major international institution presiding 
over the global trade system has no business addressing the social and 
                                                        
42 Eckersley, above n. 13, at 30.  
43 A Lang, ‘Reflecting on ‘Linkage’: Cognitive and Institutional Change in the International Trading 
System, (2007) 70(4) Modern Law Review, 537. 
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environmental impacts of that system, and that such impacts are not 'trade 
issues'44 
The narrowness of the GATT and then WTO, in focusing only on ‘trade issues’, 
was attributed by some commentators to its success in achieving its aims.45 In practical 
terms, the division between ‘trade’ and ‘non-trade’ has shaped the issues that the CTE 
has negotiated, addressed further below.  
The Decision on Trade and Environment also avoided key questions such as the 
WTO-compatibility of the NPR PPMs that gave rise to such controversy in the Tuna - 
Dolphin GATT dispute, as well as the use of trade sanctions for environmental outcomes, 
either in the context of MEAs or by individual governments. As stated by Parker, 
‘The…Committee on Trade and Environment…has declined even to discuss a possible 
role for unilateral trade measures in obtaining conservation agreements: the Committee's 
mandate was deliberately drafted to exclude it.’46  
In so doing, the CTE de facto empowered the Appellate Body to develop an 
institutional position on these issues; it was soon required to rise to the challenge. The 
1998 US – Shrimp dispute focused on the US requirement that shrimp fishing operations 
include a ‘Turtle Excluder Device’ on nets so that endangered sea turtles would not end 
up as bycatch. Unlike in GATT Tuna - Dolphin, the WTO’s powerful dispute settlement 
mechanism bound the US and the complainants, who included Thailand and Malaysia.  
                                                        
44 Ibid. 
45 H Horn and P Mavroidis, ‘MEAs in the WTO: Silence speaks volumes’, (2014) 10(1) International 
Journal of Economic Theory, 147-166.  
46 Parker, above n. 33, at 5.  
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This ruling is a cornerstone of the narrative that the WTO has made significant 
environmental progress. 47  The Appellate Body departed from Tuna – Dolphin. It 
concluded that the US regulation failed to meet the non-discrimination test imposed by 
the Article XX chapeau, as the US had not made sufficient efforts to negotiate with, and 
provide information and technical support to, the complaining countries. 48  Thus it 
critiqued the manner in which the US imposed its regulation, rather than the fact that it 
had such a regulation at all. In so doing it implicitly accepted the legitimacy of regulatory 
distinctions based upon NPR PPMs.  
 When establishing that endangered sea turtles were an ‘exhaustible natural 
resource’, the Appellate Body also made reference to various MEAs and the WTO 
Preamble’s reference to ‘sustainable development’ to justify including living resources in 
this category.49 This progressive interpretation50 implicitly deferred to MEA obligations, 
in particular CITES’ endangered species’ classifications. Also, in the context of Article 
XX(g), the Appellate Body wondered whether it was necessary for a natural resource 
being protected, in this case sea turtles, to exist within the territory of the United States, 
the country defending its measure. Crucially it acknowledged that a degree of 
unilateralism is a common aspect of regulations that fall under the subparagraphs of 
Article XX. 51  But it avoided establishing in principle that unilateral regulation with 
extraterritorial impacts could be WTO-legal, stating that there was a territorial ‘nexus’, as 
                                                        
47 This is apparent from reading the WTO website’s presentation of the dispute at:  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis08_e.htm 
48 WTO Panel Report on United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US – 
Shrimp), WT/DS58/R, adopted 15 May 1998, and Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 15 
June 2001, paras. 163, 166, 172 
49 Ibid at paras. 152, 153, 155. 
50 Although the fact that protecting threatened species was a concern of trade negotiators in the first half of 
the 20th century somewhat undermines the Appellate Body’s celebrated evolutionary interpretation. 
51 Appellate Body Report, ibid at para. 121. 
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sea turtles passed through the waters of the US.52 Thus the gains of the ruling were 
presented subtly; environmental activists certainly did not interpret it as an end to the 
struggle.  
 
E. 2001 – present: The Doha Development Agenda 
 
Countries undertook final negotiations on the Doha Ministerial Declaration (‘DMD’) 
against the backdrop of the Battle in Seattle. The ferocity of the protest was 
unprecedented, and much of it focused on environmental impacts of globalization.53 
There was tremendous pressure on the WTO to respond to this ‘legitimacy crisis.’ 54 The 
successful conclusion of the DMD in 2001 moved forward negotiations on environmental 
issues by providing the CTE with a specific mandate. Yet, in keeping with the Decision 
on Trade and Environment, it responds to countervailing goals. The text is organized 
around the concept of mutual supportiveness, demonstrating its distinct interpretations: 
first as assertion, second as selection criterion and finally as aspiration.  
Paragraph 6 states that: 
It is the potential impact of economic growth and poverty alleviation that makes 
trade a powerful ally of sustainable development. The multilateral trading system 
is an important tool to carry forward international efforts aimed at achieving this 
goal. The purpose of trade liberalisation and the WTO’s key principle of non-
                                                        
52 Appellate Body Report, above n. 46 at para. 133. 
53 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle, Archives, seattle.gov, 
https://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/digital-document-libraries/world-trade-
organization-protests-in-seattle 
54 D Esty, ‘The World Trade Organisation’s Legitimacy Crisis’ (2002) 1(1) World Trade Review, 7-22. 
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discrimination is a more efficient allocation of resources, which should be 
positive for the environment.55  
The CTE focuses on ‘triple wins’, sectors in which it is possible simultaneously to 
liberalize trade, improve economic development and protect the environment. Paragraph 
31(iii) calls for ‘the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to environmental goods and services (‘EGS’)’, as the removal of trade barriers to 
EGS will increase environmentally-preferable practices. 56  Paragraph 31 also calls 
attention to fisheries subsidies (though this negotiation is taking place under the 
Committee on Rules57). The WTO website identifies the removal of fisheries subsidies as 
a triple-win:58 they lead to overfishing and benefit largely developed countries, such that 
liberalization would have positive environment and development results. In 2014, a sub-
set of largely developed countries who account for the majority of trade in EGS agreed to 
pursue a plurilateral Environmental Goods Agreement. Given that different countries 
have different export interests, there has been disagreement about which goods should be 
on that list. Despite concerns from China in particular, negotiators are optimistic for 
progress.59  
Paragraphs 31(i) and (ii) address institutional linkages between the WTO and 
other Multilateral Environmental Agreements, calling for examination of the relationship 
between the Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO, with ‘a view toward 
                                                        
55 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted 14 November 2001, 
 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm 
56 See the WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_serv_e.htm 
57 See the WTO website on the Rules Negotiations 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rulesneg_e.htm, visited 14 September 2012. 
58 See the WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/win_e.htm, visited 14 September 
2012. 
59 ‘Ministerial Talks to Clinch Environmental Goods Agreement Hit Stumbling Block’, 8 December 2016, 
20(42) Bridges. Available at: https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/ministerial-talks-to-clinch-
environmental-goods-agreement-hit-stumbling 
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enhancing mutual supportiveness….’ [emphasis added] Thus the CTE confronts only one 
area of potential conflict between environmental and trade obligations: the WTO-MEA 
relationship. Aside from facilitating information-sharing, they have made little progress 
on settling the relationship between WTO obligations and the trade obligations imposed 
in MEAs. Various countries have made proposals for clarifying the relationship between 
them.60 Barring consensus, the CTE has simply affirmed that cooperation is better than 
unilateral action, and that both regimes are worthy of respect. Further, negotiations do not 
address disputes between MEA Parties and non-Parties, thus avoiding the most difficult 
questions arising from clashes of obligations.61 
Members have made reference to MEAs in disputes. In the 2004 EC – Biotech 
dispute between the EU and the US, the EU invoked the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
(‘CPB’) to justify its precautionary approach to GMOs. The Panel concluded that the 
obligations of the CPB did not apply in the dispute because the complainant, the US, was 
not a party.62 In 2016 India – Solar Cells, in the context of Article XX(d),63 India argued 
that local content requirements were integral to fulfilling its obligations under the 
UNFCCC. The Appellate Body construed the language of Article XX(d) narrowly in 
                                                        
60 While the EU and Switzerland have focused on the possibility of disputes and the need to provide 
guidance and clarity, the Australia, Argentina, the US and several developing countries have focused on the 
lack of existing conflict and the adequacy of existing rules and principles; for a draft negotiating text that 
attempts to reconcile some of these positions, see Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, 
World Trade Organization, TN/TE/20, 21 April 2011.  
61 Doha Declaration, above n. 53, Paragraph 31(i), ‘The negotiations shall be limited in scope to the 
applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question.’  
62 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products (‘EC – Biotech’), WT/DS/291; WT/DS/292; WT/DS/293,  para. 7.75.  
63 Article XX(d) applies to measures: ‘necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement….   
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order to conclude that the UNFCC obligations were not ‘laws and regulations’ as defined 
by the Article, as they had not been transposed into Indian domestic law.64  
The DSU calls upon Members to clarify WTO provisions in the light of 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 65  In reference to this 
requirement, the Appellate Body famously declared that the GATT ‘is not to be read in 
clinical isolation from public international law. 66  Further, as discussed above, the 
Appellate Body called upon CITES to justify an evolutionary interpretation of ‘living’ 
natural resources. Yet, while there has not been a resolved dispute that dealt with direct 
conflict, 67  the Appellate Body has ruled on treaty conflicts with Regional Trade 
Agreements, consistently affirming that WTO jurisdiction and obligations prevail over 
those set out in RTAs.68 Paragraph 32 of the DMD affirms the basis for this preeminence: 
The outcome of the negotiations carried out under paragraph 31(i) and (ii) … 
shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members under existing 
WTO agreements… nor alter the balance of these rights and obligations…. 
The Appellate Body has referenced similar language set out in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding to avoid interpreting or applying treaty commitments external to the 
WTO.  
                                                        
64 WTO Appellate Body Report, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 
(India – Solar Cells), WTO/DS456/AB/R, adopted 16 September 2016, at paras. 5.142-5.149.  
65 Article 3(2), Dispute Settlement Understanding: ‘…The Members recognize that [the dispute settlement 
system] serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to 
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law….’  
66 US – Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p. 17.  
67 A longstanding fisheries dispute between Chile and the EU which involved clashing requirements of the 
GATT and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was resolved at the stage of consultations. See: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds193_e.htm 
68 See, for example, Mexico – Soft Drinks (2006); Brazil – Tyres (2007); Peru – Agricultural Products 
(2015). 
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Vidigal argues that the Appellate Body’s approach involves attempting to 
establish the ‘common understanding’ of WTO Members vis-à-vis the external 
international legal rule at stake; evolving norms and subsequent practice inform its 
interpretation.69 This suggests a mixed picture: in the event of a dispute, the Appellate 
Body would be very cautious about elevating MEA obligations above those of the WTO, 
but also would attempt to ascertain any ‘common understanding’ of the importance of the 
objectives it pursued.  
Formally, there is no hierarchy between MEAs and the WTO, but institutionally 
the WTO has stronger enforcement mechanisms. As Eckersley has poetically concluded: 
Judged in terms of size and teeth, we might regard the WTO as a large tiger and  
MEAs as a ragged collection of small cats. The irony is that in the one area where  
certain MEAs do posses effective sanctions (ie trade restriction), they remain  
vulnerable to legal challenge in the WTO.70  
Eckersley further argues that simply the existence of the WTO and its dispute 
settlement system has a chilling effect on MEAs: it dissuades countries from strong 
adoption of trade restrictions as they know that these can be effectively challenged.71  
In fact, head-on collision in a dispute is undesirable for both sides. While 
asserting the preeminence of WTO obligations would contribute to more ‘Battles in 
Seattle’, deferring to MEA trade obligations in principle would prove controversial 
among WTO Members. This remains the key area to watch in terms of the WTO’s ability 
to deliver ‘mutual supportiveness’. 
                                                        
69 G Vidigal, ‘From Bilateral to Multilateral Law-Making: Legislation, Practice, Evolution and the Future 
of Inter Se Agreements in the WTO’ (2013) 24(4) European Journal of International Law, 1027-1053. 
70 Eckersley, above n. 13, at 24.  
71 Ibid. 
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In considering specific instances in which environmental regulation comes into 
conflict with WTO obligations, the Appellate Body inevitably plays a key role in 
establishing whether mutual supportiveness can be achieved in specific regulatory 
scenarios. Indeed, Sampson sets out a potential resolution of contradictory assertions that 
trade liberalization and environmental protection are mutually supportive, but also 
threaten one another. He writes: 
Those promoting the virtues of trade liberalisation would not deny that trade 
liberalisation and growth can be harmful to the environment, or that trade 
liberalisation per se will not necessarily achieve sustainable development….The 
WTO response is that, for benefits to be realised and for trade-induced growth to be 
sustainable, national environmental, income distribution and social policies should 
be put in place.’72 
In other words, national environmental regulation is essential to bring about mutual 
supportiveness. Formally, the WTO supports Members in setting such policies. As the 
Preamble to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (‘TBT Agreement’) states:  
No country should be prevented from taking measures necessary…for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the 
prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate.73  
In the context of Article XX, the Appellate Body has made clear that the level of 
protection a Member desires will be respected.74  
                                                        
72 Sampson, above n. 6, at 55. 
73 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Article 12. 
74 It has affirmed this multiple times, eg in Brazil – Tyres, where it stated that ‘[Brazil’s import ban on re-
treaded tyres] illustrates the tensions that may exist between, on the one hand, international trade and, on 
the other hand, public health and environmental concerns arising from the handling of waste generated by a 
product at the end of its useful life. In this respect, the fundamental principle is the right that WTO 
Members have to determine the level of protection that they consider appropriate in a given context.’ WTO 
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If desired environmental protection is compatible with WTO obligations, this 
suggests that less trade-restrictive means are normally available to achieve the goal. 
However, as Brack asserted with reference to the Montreal Protocol, trade-restriction can 
be a useful strategy in achieving environmental aims. In fact, the existence of direct 
conflict can be deduced by Appellate Body’s own approach: under GATT Article XX 
and loosely analogous provisions elsewhere, notably the TBT Agreement, it undertakes a 
kind of limited proportionality reasoning.75 This includes examining whether a measure’s 
structure and application are designed to discriminate against imported products, 
determining the appropriateness of the means-ends relationship between the regulation 
and the goal, and assessing the reasonable availability of other measures to achieve that 
goal.  
Examining the importance of the regulatory goal at stake implies that more 
important goals justify more trade restriction. Elsewhere the Appellate Body has utilized 
the concept of balancing between competing objectives. The Appellate Body Report of 
US – Clove Cigarettes, a 2012 dispute under the TBT Agreement, concluded that: 
…the object and purpose of the TBT Agreement is to strike a balance between, on 
the one hand, the objective of trade liberalization and, on the other hand, 
Members’ right to regulate….”76 [Emphasis added] 
Thus the approach of the Appellate Body mirrors the ambiguity of the CTE 
regarding the mutual supportiveness of trade liberalization and environmental regulation. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil – Tyres), 
WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 3 December 2007.  
75 See E Lydgate, ‘Sorting out Mixed Messages Under the National Treatment Principle: A proposed 
approach’ (2016) 15(3) World Trade Review, 423-450. 
76 WTO Appellate Body Report on Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – 
Clove Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 4 April 2012, para. 174. 
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It simultaneously affirms the compatibility of domestic environmental regulation with 
WTO obligations and recognizes that there can be tradeoffs between them. Note that the 
Appellate Body also maintained this mirroring through its careful agnosticism in US – 
Shrimp on the WTO-legality of extraterritorially-applied domestic regulation.  
The WTO Secretariat has also continued to feed into ongoing international 
environmental developments. In 2009 the WTO Secretariat co-authored a long, detailed 
report on climate change with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), which examines 
‘linkages’ between trade and climate.77 The report does not shrink from controversy: it 
acknowledges that trade opening contributes to climate change. It also offers a critical 
assessment of the Kuznet’s curve idea underlying the concept of ‘mutual supportiveness’ 
between trade and environment; namely, that higher incomes lead to less CO2 emission.78  
This stands in contrast to the Report the Secretariat prepared for the Rio + 20 
Conference of 2012, which encapsulated debates that remain largely unchanged from the 
1970s. One of the main obstacles to concluding an outcome document was developing 
countries’ concern that pursuing a green economy, a central focus of the Conference, 
meant sanctioning green protectionism to give rich countries a competitive advantage, 
and de-emphasizing poverty reduction. 79  Recalling the GATT contribution for the 
UNCED in the early 1970s, the Secretariat’s report provided an outline of what types of 
environmental regulations countries might adopt, and which WTO provisions were 
                                                        
77 Trade and Climate Change: WTO-UNEP report 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf 
78 Ibid. at 53-56 
79 ‘Countries agree to extend negotiations on Rio+20 outcome document’, 5 May 2012, UN News, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41933#.WZQkTYqQyLI 
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applicable to each situation. 80 It also proposed language for the outcome document, ‘The 
Future we Want’. The Report incorporated many of these recommendations, stating: 
We affirm that green economy policies in the context of sustainable development 
and poverty eradication should:  
…h) Not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, avoid unilateral actions to deal with 
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country, and 
ensure that environmental measures addressing transboundary or global 
environmental problems, as far as possible, are based on an international 
consensus….81 
This demonstrates that the core discourses surrounding the ‘trade and environment’ 
relationship have not transcended traditional divides.  
 Finally, the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals reflect a harmonious 
conception of the trade and environment relationship, noting that trade, and the 
conclusion of the Doha Round of negotiations,82 will contribute to the achievement of a 
number of the goals.   
 
 4. Current developments 
 
                                                        
80 ‘Harnessing Trade for Sustainable Development and a Green Economy, World Trade Organization 
(2012), V. Green economy measures and guarding against trade protectionism’, 9. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/brochure_rio_20_e.pdf 
81 Paragraph 58, ‘The Future We Want’, United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 22 June 
2012, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/rio20/futurewewant 
82 See WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/sdgs_e/sdgs_e.htm. Note also SDG 
indicator 17.10 at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17 
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At the time of writing, tectonic shifts are occurring in the global trading system, which 
are influencing established narratives, likely including those on ‘trade and environment’. 
The Trump administration has abandoned the postwar consensus that trade openness 
underpinned by a rules-based system leads to peace and prosperity. Trump has indicated 
that the US will not follow Appellate Body rulings with which it does not agree,83 and 
has attempted to undermine the functioning of the Appellate Body.84  At the time of 
writing, one year into Trump’s first term, I speculate on relevant implications.  
 
5. New alliances between ‘multilateralists’ 
 
The US’s undermining of the WTO demonstrates what Slaughter describes as a 
‘transactional’ view of foreign policy: international institutions are abandoned except 
when they serve the needs of the moment.85 The EU in contrast has positioned itself as 
champion of the WTO and multilateral trade liberalization, as celebrated in recent 
remarks by WTO Director General Azavedo.86 The US has also announced that it will 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement; in response the EU and China, another champion of 
the multilateral trade system, have intensified their commitment to upholding it.87 Thus 
                                                        
83 ‘Trump Administration would ignore WTO rulings it sees as anti-US: FT’, March 1, 2017, Reuters, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-wto-idUKKBN16832U 
84 G Shaffer, et al, ‘Trump is fighting an open war on trade. His stealth war on trade may be even more 
important,’ Washington Post, 29 September 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/09/27/trump-is-fighting-an-open-war-on-trade-his-stealth-war-on-trade-may-be-even-more-
important/?utm_term=.70d818d0e1cf 
85 A Slaughter, ‘The Return of Anarchy?’ March 15, 2017, Journal of International Affairs, Columbia 
University. Available at: https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/return-anarchy 
86 ‘DG Azevêdo welcomes EU trade ministers’ strong support for global trading system’, 2 March 2017, 
WTO website: 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/dgra_02mar17_e.htm 
87 D Boffey and R Neslen, ‘China and EU strengthen promise to Paris deal with US poised to step away’, 1 
June 2017, Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/may/31/china-eu-
climate-lead-paris-agreement 
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the WTO and UNFCCC/Paris Agreement are united as international law instruments 
made newly-vulnerable by US opposition. Trump has claimed in the past that China 
invented climate change in order to damage US manufacturing.88 This rhetoric conflates 
China’s role as great trade and manufacturing power with its commitment to climate 
change prevention. Further, the EU and Japan have recently concluded the first trade 
agreement that commits them to implementing the Paris Agreement.89  
The EU has been critiqued for climate change unilateralism: exporting its 
regulatory requirements as a condition of market access.90 In the wake of US withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement, some commentators, including then-French Presidential 
candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, suggested that the EU should retaliate by imposing carbon 
taxes on all US products. 91  While such an approach encompasses unilateralism and 
domestic protectionism, it also responds to concerns that the integrity of the global 
commitment to addressing climate change will be undermined by the US’s action. 
Countries who wish to maintain existing structures of international law in the face of US 
opposition are united by attempts to shore up these institutions. In such a situation, MEAs 
and the WTO find the emphasis on what they have in common rather than what sets them 
apart.  
 
B: Trade versus non-trade issues 
                                                        
88 See tweet of 6 November 2012, 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en-gb 
89 ‘EU – Japan Economic Partnership Agreement’ European Commission News, 6 July 2017: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement-2017-jul-06_en 
90 J Scott and L Rajamani, ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism’ (2012) 23(2) European Journal of 
International Law, 469-494.  
91 B Kentish, ‘Nicolas Sarkozy promises to hit America with a carbon tax if Donald Trump rips up 





Trump has depicted trade liberalization as resulting in US unemployment,92 a perceived 
failure echoed by other populist movements.93 This charge is led from the right of the 
political spectrum, an outlook not celebrated by environmental activists. Nonetheless, the 
attack on traditional assumptions regarding trade liberalization’s contribution to 
prosperity signifies a period of deep popular scrutiny of the assumptions behind the WTO 
and regional trade and investment agreements. For environmentalists, perhaps the best-
case scenario for a period in many ways destructive to their aims would be to prompt 
constructive re-imagining of the international trade project by its remaining advocates. 
There is a settled narrative that WTO law must reconcile trade and ‘non-trade’ issues, 
with environment constituting the latter. This division is pervasive in scholarship of 
international trade lawyers, yet underscores the very dichotomy it seeks to address. 
Perversely, it narrows the understanding of what trade liberalization should be ‘about’ by 
situating environmental protection as an auxiliary concern.94 As documented herein, a 
more expansive vision of the remit and responsibilities of an international trade 
organization is evident in the never-ratified ITO, which placed employment on equal 
footing with trade and explicitly deferred to existing MEAs.   
With both the WTO and MEAs under unprecedented attack, it is a fertile moment 
to revisit, and shore up, assumptions underlying the ‘trade and environment’ relationship.   
                                                        
92 See, eg: ‘Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade’, June 18, 2016, Time. Available at: 
http://time.com/4386335/donald-trump-trade-speech-transcript/ 
93 Eg concerns about EU citizens taking UK jobs due to free movement of people and economic integration 
fueled the UK vote to leave the EU. ‘Voting to leave the EU could mean more jobs will go to Britons rather 
than foreign workers, according to research’, M Reynolds, ‘Three of four EU workers will be kicked out in 
Brexit’ 6 May 2016, Express. Available at: http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/667952/EU-Brexit-
jobs-Britons-EU-workers 
94 Lang, above n. 43.  
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Ultimately, an attempt to understand these discourses requires reckoning with ideological 
assumptions polarized among some meaning makers. We must ask: how can we move 




The WTO and major international environmental law treaties, in order to achieve 
consensus, have found language that simultaneously encourages environmental 
protection, promotes poverty reduction and enshrines trade opening. I have argued that 
the concept of ‘mutual supportiveness’ has been useful in this respect, but has 
underpinned limited environmental ambitions. This begs the question: what would a more 
ambitious approach to foregrounding environmental protection in the world trading 
system entail? While a full examination is beyond the scope of these concluding remarks, 
I outline briefly three potential approaches. The first does not have to do with the WTO at 
all: a similar aim would be achieved if the system of treaties and international 
organizations responsible for protecting the environment were strengthened. This would 
correct the ‘chilling’ effect on MEAs identified by Eckersley: if MEAs possessed equally 
strong enforcement mechanisms, countries would not prioritize their WTO obligations.  
 Another strategy would be for the WTO to incorporate MEAs with trade 
obligations as part of the WTO covered agreements. This would prevent treaty conflict 
and put MEAs on a level playing field. While this approach has obvious appeal, in that 
relevant MEAs would receive the benefits of the WTO’s strong dispute settlement 
system, Horn and Mavroidis provide a compelling analysis of some of the administrative 
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and negotiating challenges that would result from an attempt to address trade and 
environmental goals through a single multilateral organization.95 
Finally, within in easiest reach, the WTO could simply increase the ambitions of 
its existing agenda. For example, CTE negotiations should be expanded to include fossil 
fuel subsidies, surely the most environmentally-meaningful trade liberalization ‘triple 
win’.96 Negotiations on the MEA-WTO relationship should have the goal of deferring 
appropriately to MEA trade obligations, and should expand to include disputes involving 
non-Parties. The WTO should establish stronger institutional partnerships with UNEP 
and relevant MEAs of the type that led to the 2009 joint report on climate change.  
In the end, the feasibility of reform comes back to political will. In a WTO-
sponsored debate, Mark Halle of the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
stated:  
…the Preamble [of the Marrakesh Agreement] calls for an approach to trade that 
is supportive of sustainable development. For a long time this was dismissed as, 
well sure that is our aspirational goal, but we have business to do. What’s 
happening is that we are realizing that trade has to serve an ultimate goal, and 
that ultimate goal is the kind of world we want our children to live in. And I think 
there’s a real opportunity now to get there.97  
In the context of deep structural reform, the WTO’s multilateral strength is also its 
weakness. It suffers in comparison to many Regional Trade Agreements, which go 
                                                        
95 H Horn and P Mavroidis, ‘MEAs in the WTO: Silence speaks volumes’, (2014) 10(1) International 
Journal of Economic Theory, 147-166. 
96 See JP Trachtman, ‘Fossil Fuels subsidy reduction and the World Trade Organization’, Issue Paper: 
Climate and Energy, ICTSD, October 2017.  
97 ‘Debate: Trade and Sustainable Development’, World Trade Organization, 18 June 2012, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ly5FsL_dpbI , at 9:08 
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further in safeguarding domestic environmental laws and MEA commitments.98 On the 
global stage that the WTO provides, deep divisions remain about what our world should 
ideally look like and how the world trading system can facilitate its realization. 
 
 
                                                        
98 See EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, above. CETA also contains a chapter on Trade and 
Environment requiring, among other things, that Parties should not weaken environmental protection in 
order to encourage trade and investment. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Chapter 24, 
Article 24.5. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/ 
